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I.

There Is A Circuit Conflict Regarding Whether
The ADEA Precludes A Section 1983 Action
To Redress Unconstitutional Age-Based Discrimination

The Third Circuit decision in this case expressly
recognized that it conflicts with the Seventh Circuit
decision in Levin v. Madigan, 692 F. 3d 607 (7th Cir.
2012) ("Levin I"). Pet.App. 15a, 16a, 18a, 19a. The
Seventh Circuit decision in Levin I was avowedly inconsistent with earlier decisions in the Fourth, Fifth,
Ninth and Tenth Circuits. 692 F.3d at 616. A series of
district court decisions have recognized this circuit
split. Pet. 11. Although these appellate and trial court
decisions have divergent views about the merits, they
agree that there is a well-established circuit conflict.
(1) Respondent asserts that "Levin's extended
analysis of whether the ADEA preempts age discrimination suits under § 1983 was limited to whether it
does so for non-ADEA-covered employees." Br.Opp.
11. That is incorrect. Nothing in the Seventh Circuit's
analysis of the preclusion issue is "limited to," or even
about, non-ADEA-covered workers. That analysis as1
sumed that Levin was covered by the ADEA.

1

The Seventh Circuit argued that because this Court has
invalidated the ADEA insofar as it authorizes actions against
states, Ki1nel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000),
"[w]ithout the availability of a § 1983 claim, a state employee
(like Levin) who suffers age discrimination in the course of his
employment is left without a federal damages remedy." 692 F.3d
(Continued on following page)
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The Seventh Circuit decision in Levin I treated
the preclusion issue as posing a single question whether the ADEA precludes section 1983 Equal Protection age discrimination claims - , not several different questions depending on whether a particular
plaintiff or claim is covered or remedied by theADEA.
The Seventh Circuit explained that "the issue before
us [is] whether the ADEA precludes a § 1983 equal
protection claim," 692 F.3d at 615, and "conclude[d]
that the ADEA is not the exclusive remedy for age
discrimination in employment claims." 692 F.3d at
622. During the oral argument in Madigan v. Levin,
cert. dismissed, 134 S.Ct. 2 (2014), Justice Sotomayor
correctly described the decision in Levin I:
[T]he Seventh Circuit held that no one is
precluded from a section 1983 claim whether
they're an employee or a non-employee. That's
the way the case was litigated. That's the
way they decided. The broad statement,
whether he's an employee or not an employee
... he has [a] 1983 action.
Oral Argument 37, available at 2013 WL 5522663.
Justice Scalia noted that the Seventh Circuit had
decided that the ADEA does not preclude section 1983
claims by covered employees. See n.8, supra. That is
how the Seventh Circuit decision in Levin I was also
characterized by counsel for the state petitioner at

at 621. That argument necessarily assumed that Levin was
covered by the ADEA, and would thus be affected by Kimel.

3
oral argument in this Coure and by counsel for the
state on remand in Levin. 3
The brief in opposition illustrates the welldeveloped nature of the circuit split. Respondents
argue that under Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992
(1984) and Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, 555 U.S. 246 (2009), the mere existence of a comprehensive statutory remedial scheme would bar
section 1983 action to enforce a constitutional right,
as it usually would bar a section 1983 action to
enforce a statute. Br.Opp. 20-28 (citing Middlesex
County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981)). That very argument is the
linchpin of the Third Circuit decision below. Pet.App.
10-21. But the Seventh Circuit in Levin I emphatically rejected this approach. 692 F.3d at 611-21.
2

Oral Argument, 20 ("MR. SCODRO: ... [T]he Seventh Circuit .. . pronounced a rule that was indifferent as between appointees and employees.").
3
Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Status Report, Levin
v. Madigan, available at 2014 WL 1030446 ("[T]he appellate
court ... held that the ADEA did not displace the § 1983 remedy
for any individuals, whether or not they were 'employees' under
the statute. See [692 F.3d] at 621-22 .... [T]he appellate court's
broad holding regarding ADEA displacement made no distinction between covered and exempted individuals."); DefendantsAppellants' Response to Plaintiff-Appellee's Motion to Dismiss
Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction or for Summary Affirmance, No.
14-2244 (7th Cir.), 9 (noting the ''broad ruling from this Court
in Levin I that the ADEA did not displace a § 1983 age discrimination claim for both employees under that statute and nonemployees.").

4

"For the preclusion of constitutional claims, we believe more is required than a comprehensive remedial
scheme." 692 F.3d at 618 (emphasis in original).
"[E]ven though the ADEA is a comprehensive remedial scheme, ... we cannot say that the ADEA's
scheme alone is enough to preclude § 1983 constitutional claims." 692 F.3d at 618. Respondents do
not contend that the ADEA meets the more demanding standard applied to section 1983 constitutional
claims by the Seventh Circuit in Levin I.
Respondents suggest that the subsequent Seventh Circuit in Levin v. Madigan, 2014 WL 6736999
(7th Cir. Sept. 30, 2014) ("Levin IT'), "characterized
its prior, original decision (on which petitioner now
relies) solely in terms of its conclusion that the underlying equal protection rights were clearly established,
without regard to the § 1983 preemption question."
Br.Opp. 14 n.2 (emphasis added). To the contrary, in
Levin II the Seventh Circuit clearly described the
preclusion holding in Levin I. "The first appeal ...
included the argument that age discrimination claims
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are preempted by the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act. This court
rejected that preemption argument .... " Levin II, 2014
WL 6736999 at *1. Respondents also assert that in
Levin II the Seventh Circuit indicated that Levin I
had no bearing on whether the ADEA precluded a
section 1983 action of a covered employee.
[W]hen the Levin defendants filed an interlocutory appeal of a district court ruling on
remand that Levin's § 1983 claims were not

5
preempted by the Government Employee
Rights Act - an enactment not previously
-considered in the litigation extending ADEAtype rights to government employees, like
Levin, who are exempted from ADEA coverage - the Seventh Circuit declined to hold
that Levin already resolved the preemption
issue for this non-covered employee.
Br.Opp. 14 n.2 (emphasis added). The phrase "declined to hold" suggests that Levin II actually analyzed the defendant's new preclusion contention, and
in doing so rejected an argument that Levin I applied
to covered employees. But in fact Levin II simply
never reached the preclusion issue; the Seventh Circuit merely rejected qualified immunity. "This court
already has ruled ... that the appellants are not entitled to qualified immunity, regardless of the preemption question.... [G]iven the court's earlier ruling
on qualified immunity, we need not address preemption in this appeal." Levin II, 2014 WL 6736999 at *1.
The defendants-appellants in Levin II agreed that
Levin I applied to ADEA-covered employees. See n.3,
supra.
(2) Respondents argue in the alternative that in
Levin I the Seventh Circuit should not have decided
whether the ADEA precludes section 1983 Equal
Protection actions by ADEA-covered employees. None
of the various iterations of this argument are persuasive.

The Seventh Circuit decision does not contain
distinct analyses and holdings dealing separately

6
with section 1983 actions by ADEA-covered and nonADEA-covered workers. The analysis in Levin I of
this Court's decisions in the Sea Clarrimers and
Robinson line of cases was equally applicable to both
groups of potential plaintiffs. The Seventh Circuit.
was not obligated to look for some alternative ground
that applied only to one group or the other.
It is assuredly not the case, as respondents suggest, that the "facts" in Levin I involved a non-covered
employee. To the contrary, at the time of Levin I the
parties were embroiled in a protracted legal dispute
about whether Levin was covered by the ADEA. In
2008 a district court decision in the Levin litigation
held that Levin was covered. Levin v. Madigan, 2008
WL 4286668 at *2-*5 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 12, 2008). Three
years later another district court decision in that case
concluded that Levin was not covered. Levin v. Madigan, 2011 WL 2708341 at *9-*11 (N.D.Ill. July 12,
2011). The appeal in Levin I was limited to whether
the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity;
the coverage issue was not before the Seventh Circuit.
Respondents imply that the Seventh Circuit in
Levin I resolved the dispute about whether Levin was
covered by the ADEA. That is not so. Respondents
assert that "the Seventh Circuit noted in describing
the procedural background of the case, [that] ... Levin.
was 'not an "employee" for purposes of Title VII and
the ADEA, thus foreclosing any claim Levin could
bring under those statutes.' Levin, 692 F.3d at 610
(emphasis added)." Br.Opp. 11. But the quoted passage from Levin I is not a holding by the appellate

7

court regarding Levin's status, but only a description
of the 2011 district court opinion. The Seventh Circuit
did not "note[] . .. that Levin was 'not an "employee" '"; rather, it noted that "[District] Judge
Chang [in 20 11] determined that Levin is not an
'employee' .... " 692 F.3d at 610.
Respondents insist that "[t]he Seventh Circuit
never addressed, let alone reversed, the district
court's finding that Levin was not covered by the
ADEA." Br.Opp. 11. But the Seventh Circuit failed to
"reverse[]" the 2011 district court conclusion because
the appellate court's limited jurisdiction over the
qualified immunity appeal did not include the coverage issue.
Respondents assert that it is "clear that the Seventh Circuit was not asked to decide whether an
ADEA-covered employee may bring an age discrimination suit under § 1983." Br.Opp. 10 (emphasis
added and omitted). That is not correct. The defendants in Levin urged the Seventh Circuit to broadly
hold that the ADEA bars section 1983 Equal Protection claims. Their argument that was never limited to any particular group of workers, 4 and their
4

Brief of Defendants-Appellants, Levin v. Madigan, No. 112820 (7th Cir.), 13 ("the ADEA's comprehensive remedial scheme
forecloses constitutional claims by state or local employees for
age discrimination in employment under § 1983."), 16, 17; Reply
Brief of Defendants-Appellants, Levin v. Madigan, No. 11-2820
(7th Cir.), 7 ("the ADEA displaces § 1983 claims by state and
local employees for violations of the Equal Protection Clause
based on age"), 8.

8
brief did not even mention the dispute regarding
whether Levin himself was covered by the ADEA.
The defendants repeatedly argued in Levin I that if
section 1983 actions were not precluded, employees
could "circumvent," "avoid," and "evade" the ADEA
administrative scheme, 5 an argument that was only
applicable to ADEA-covered employees. Similarly,
Levin urged the Seventh Circuit to hold that the
ADEA does not preclude section 1983 claims, a contention that was not limited to or directed at any
particular group of potential plaintiffs. 6 As counsel for
the petitioners in Madigan v. Levin correctly explained to this Court during the oral argument, "the
Seventh Circuit was asked to announce a rule that is
indifferent as to employees and appointees." Oral
Argument, 20. 7
(3) In this Court the problem which led to the
dismissal of the writ in Madigan v. Levin arose because of the particular manner in which the petitioners framed the Question Presented.
5

Brief of Defendants-Appellants, 12, 20, 22, 23.
Brief of Plaintiff, Appellee, Harvey Levin, 37, available at
2012 WL 6763830; see Reply Brief for Petitioners, Madigan v.
Levin, 2 (''Respondent never argued below that [if he is not covered by the ADEA] his § 1983 claim survives even if an employee's would not.").
7
In the Madigan litigation, the parties used the term "employee" to refer to covered individuals and "appointee" to refer to
certain non-covered workers. Section 630(f) of the ADEA defines
"employee" (the persons covered by the Act) to exclude certain
appointees. 29 U.S.C. § 630(f).
6

9
Although the Seventh Circuit in Levin I had
broadly held (without limitation as to any particular
type of worker) that the ADEA does not preclude
section 1983 actions, the petition in Madigan set out
a Question Presented that was limited to workers
who actually are covered by the ADEA.
Whether the Seventh Circuit erred in holding
... that state and local government employees
may avoid the Federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act's comprehensive remedial
regime by bringing age discrimination claims
directly under the Equal Protection Clause
and 42 U.S.C. §1983.
Pet., i (emphasis added). Only ADEA-covered workers
could be said to "avoid" the ADEA remedial scheme by
filing a section 1983 action.
Petitioners' merits brief, however, proceeded on
the assumption that Levin was not covered by the
ADEA at all. Brief for Petitioners, 37. Respondent in
turn acknowledged that the 2011 district court decision in that case had held that Levin was not covered
by the ADEA; in a deliberately phrased statement,
respondent observed: "There is no realistic possibility
that this determination will be overturned on appeal." Brief for Respondent, 9. In reply, petitioners
did not argue that there was a significant chance
that the Seventh Circuit might at some point in the
future hold that Levin was covered by the ADEA.
Instead, they contended that the ADEA precludes
section 1983 claims by non-covered workers. Reply
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Brief for Petitioners, 3. But the Question Presented
was not about non-covered workers.
At oral argument in Madigan, the posture of the
case became even more complicated. Counsel for respondent reiterated that there was not a "realistic
possibility" the Seventh Circuit would hold Levin was
covered by the ADEA, but repeatedly balked when
asked to formally stipulate that Levin was not covered. Oral Argument 26-29, 37-38. Counsel for petitioners at first argued that the ADEA precluded
section 1983 actions by even non-covered workers, id.
at 16, but later appeared to say the opposite. Id. at
49. The Court subsequently dismissed the writ as
improvidently granted. 134 S.Ct. 2 (2013).
This regrettable series of developments did not
alter the meaning or significance of the Seventh Circuit decision in Levin I or the conflict that it created. 8

II.

The Question Presented Is Ripe for Review
by This Court

When this Court granted review in Madigan v.
Levin, the question at issue had been addressed by
8

Oral Argument, 41-42: "JUSTICE SCALIA: ... [W]e're
asked to review a holding by the Seventh Circuit that even if ...
you're not exempt, you still have a 1983 claim. That's- that's
why we took this case. And now you're - you're telling us we
should not review what the Seventh Circuit held. And that would
presumably remain the circuit law, right? MR. THEOBALD: Yes,
Your Honor."
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the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits.
The question presented has now also been considered
at length by the Third Circuit. The legal issues involved have been well vetted by the lower courts, and
the question is ripe for decision by this Court.
Respondents suggest that review be deferred to
permit the lower courts to further debate the significance of this Court's 2009 decision in Fitzgerald.
Br.Opp. 17. But we emphatically did not contend (and
respondents do not contend) that the decision in
Fitzgerald changed the governing standard. To the
contrary, the petition makes abundantly clear that
Fitzgerald merely applied the same standard utilized
in the 1984 decision in Smith v. Robinson. Pet. 13-21.
Respondents themselves acknowledge that petitioner's
"criticism of Hildebrand rests on his ... reading of
the legal standard applied in Smith and Fitzgerald."
Br.Opp. 19 (emphasis added). The Seventh Circuit in
Levin I relied on this Court's decisions in Robinson
and in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), as
well as on Fitzgerald. 692 F. 3d at 612-19.
Further delay was not warranted when this Court
granted review almost two years ago in Madigan v.
Levin, and it would make even less sense today. It is
unlikely that other lower courts will add significantly
to the detailed and well-reasoned conflicting decisions
of the Third Circuit in the instant case and of the
Seventh Circuit in Levin I. Respondents do not suggest that further consideration of the 2009 decision
in Fitzgerald is going to eliminate the conflict by
prompting the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Tenth
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Circuits to all abandon their well-established holdings that the ADEA precludes section 1983 Equal
Protection claims for age discrimination. The controlling issue in the lower courts has been a disagreement about the relationship between the Sea
Clammers line of cases and the Smith line of cases;
additional lower court commentary about the meaning of this Court's past decisions will not enhance
this Court's ability to resolve the question presented.

III. This Case Presents An Excellent Vehicle for
Resolving The Question Presented
This case presents an ideal vehicle for deciding
the question presented. There has never been any
dispute that petitioner is an employee covered by the
ADEA. The decision of the Third Circuit rests solely
on its holding- contrary to the Seventh Circuit decision in Levin I - that the ADEA precludes any
section 1983 Equal Protection action for age discrimination.
Respondents argue that, even if the Third Circuit
decision is overturned, they may ultimately prevail
on other grounds. They contend that the complaint in
this case lacks sufficient allegations to establish liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services
of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Br.Opp. 1517. But that proffered defense, as respondents acknowledge, is "an independent, alternative" issue (Br.Opp.
15), in no way related to the preclusion question. "The
Third Circuit never addressed this separate [ground]"

13
(Br.Opp. 17), and respondents do not suggest that
this Court itself should consider that issue. If petitioner prevails in this Court on the question of
whether the ADEA precludes his section 1983 claim,
respondents would be free on remand to advance this
defense.

--------·-------CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, a writ of certiorari should
issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
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